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1. Introduction 
This paper analyses the relationship between the governments of Swaziland and South 
Africa in order to explain how it is that Swaziland has in recent years become 
Pretoria's most reliable and most pliable ally; why, in a period of escalating 
struggle inside South Africa and of the growing international isolation of the Botha 
government, Swaziland should choose to accord virtually full diplomatic recognition 
to that government by allowing it to open a trade mission in Mbabane - one which is, 
according to its Commissioner, Hvirtually an embassy in everything but name" (1); 
and how, at its official opening, the Swazi Foreign Minister could pay his South 
African counterpart, Pik Botha, the compliment of informing him that Ithe no longer 
needed a passport to visit the Kingdom". (2) In short, it attempts to explain why 
Swaziland has apparently crossed into the apartheid camp to join its resistance to 
the armed struggle for democratic change in South Africa. 
The conventional explanation focusses on economic factors and South 
Africa's economic dominance of the region. It stresses Swaziland's land-locked 
condition and the transportation and trade consequences that flow therefrom; her 
energy, fuel and other forms of dependencs; the vital nature of the revenue earned 
from membership in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU); and the importance of 
the South African labour market. (3) These are used to justify a conclusion that 
Swaziland has no choice but to "play Pretoria's game". It is the price South Africa 
exacts for Swaziland's economic dependence. 
This argument, however, is deficient in many respects. It is only a 
partial explanation and one that tends to mislead. If it constituted the whole 
explanation, then one would expect Botswana and Lesotho to have the same intimate 
dealings with South Africa for both exist in a structurally similar subordinate 
relationship to South Africa and are equally - probably more so - vulnerable to 
economic manipulation. Yet they do not and thefie is a qualitative difference 
between them and Swaziland in both their attitudes to, and dealings with, the 
apartheid government. They have not signed security agreements, have not exchanged 
trade missions and have not engaged in mass expulsions of the ANC. Both have 
appealed for the imposition of mandatory economic sanctions while Swaziland has 
taken the opposite position. Their relations are, in diplomatic terms, "cool" ar,d 
distant, unlike Swaziland's. These differences illustrate that, even in the 
imperialist context of Southern Africa today, there are options and degrees of 
submissiveness and collaboration and that economic domination and coercion are not 
the sole determinants of BLS' behaviour. And the same argument applies to the use 
or threat of military power. Rather than actually determining the nature and extent 
of BLS' co-operation with Pretoria, what these factors do is determine the limits of 
what assistance can be given to Pretoria's opponents. Beyond them, they risk 
Pretoria's retaliatory wrath. A decision to co-operate with Pretoria in its 
resistance to the liberation struggle must therefore be a product of other factors. 
The main focus, therefore, will be on "political" factors, but first the 
economic relations between Swaziland and South Africa - the constraining factor - 
will be examined. While here again the three BLS states share some broad 
similarities, close analysis reveals that the political economy of Swaziland 
contains some unusual, and some unique, features, while her colonial experience was 
very different and more like that of Southern Rhodesia (penetration by settler and 
multinational capital, land alienation). Swaziland is therefore a different 
political entity from Botswana and Lesotho and it is important to grasp this point 
because it has produced some of the factors and forces that have, in turn, produced 
the differences in the relationship to South Africa referred to earlier. (4) 
2. Economic Relations 
The South African involvement in, and domination of, the Swazi economy is enormous 
and growing. This gives Pretoria various ways by which it can constrain and 
pressurize Swaziland. These can be grouped under three headings: the presence and 
role of foreign capital; transportation, fuel, energy and water dependence; and 
membership in SACU. 
(a) The presence and role of foreign capital 
The Swazi economy is overwhelmingly owned, controlled and/or managed by 
foreign capital. Until independence in 1968 this meant British capital, with the 
Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) as the main generator of investment into 
largely agro-industry (sugar, timber and citrus). Since then, British capital's 
domination has been eclipsed by South African and it is only in banking and 
agriculture that the British presence remains significant. Even this statement has 
to be qualified, however. Outside of the sugar industry, where CDC, Lonhro and Tate 
and Lyle are still the dominant actors, a gradual incorporation of major 
agro-industrial concerns by South African capital is under way. (5) It is also 
somewhat misleading to describe the Swazi operations of Standard and Barclays Banks 
as representing British capital. Through Swaziland's membership of SACU and the 
Rand Monetary Area, their operations are necessarily more integrated into the South 
African banking system than with those of their English parent companies. Interest 
rates, for example, are adjusted in response to changes effected by the South 
African Reserve Bank. Nevertheless, their top expatriate management continues to be 
drawn from Britain. 
In manufacturing, mercantile trade, tourism and transportation, South 
African capital has a near monopoly position (6), while its minority stake in mining 
has been transformed into a monopoly by General Mining's (GENCOR1s) purchase of 
Swaziland's abestos and coal mines (7) and the commencement of diamond mining by a 
subsidiary of the Rembrandt group. 
Increasingly, therefore, the Swaziland economy is an extension of the 
South African, and important "p~litical~~ consequences follow from this. 
Collectively, South African capital is now second only to the ailing sugar industry 
as the biggest employer in the country, while it is also responsible for the "good 
life" for which Swaziland is renowned in Africa. In a context of rapidly rising 
unemployment and a 3.4% birth rate which is producing school leavers far in excess 
of the labour market's capacity to absorb them, any significant withdrawal by South . 
African capital would have serious adverse effects - both in terms of the job market 
and of the living standards of the urban-based classes, who have become thoroughly 
accustomed to materialism and rampant consumerism. Moreover, both because its 
economic interests would be damaged and because it is politically vulnerable 
domestically, the Swazi ruling class will risk nothing that could lead to a 
reduction in South African capital's presence, and this includes not alienating the 
Botha government. 
(b) Transportation links, fuel, energy and water dependence 
More than 90% of Swaziland's import traffic and a large proportion of its 
exports flow through South Africa, and virtually all of it on carriers operated by 
the South African Transport Services (SATS), which holds a near monopoly on freight 
haulage. (8) The only alternative to transit through South Africa is the railway to 
Maputo, but since 1984 this has hardly operated, owing to the effects of Cyclone 
Domoina and MNR sabotage. Unsurprisingly, therefore, all of Swaziland's petroleum 
is imported by way of South Africa while, in addition, 70% of its electricity is 
purchased from ESCOM. 
Despite Swaziland's membership in SADCC and that organization's objective 
of reducing its member's transportation dependence upon South Africa, and 
concurrently with a SADCC project to improve the road between Swaziland and Maput~, 
a joint South African-Swazi project is under way which will increase the integration 
of the two countries' rail systems. It involves the construction of a 120 km long 
railway fiom Komatipoort in the eastern Transvaal to the rail-head of Swazi 
Railway's southern link to Richards Bay in Natal. When completed in 1986, the 
Maputo line - whether open or not - will be almost redundant to Swaziland's needs. 
(9) This project characterises Swaziland's ambivalent attitude to SADCC - it will 
accept benefits the organization offers but will not deviate from what it considers 
its essential interests, even where those run directly counter to SADCC1s goals. 
Here it is also worth noting that in the late 1970s SATS took over an assistance 
programme to Swazi Railways so that today "officials seconded by the SAR for service 
in Swaziland form a large section of the top management1'. (10) 
While Swaziland has a number of largish rivers and suffers less frequently 
from periods of drought than most African countries, it does have a water problem. 
It has more irrigable land than water to irrigate with, and most of its rivers rise 
in the eastern Transvaal, an area where water consumption has increased dramatically 
in the last decade because of the building of power plants and Sasol I1 and 111: 
e.g. the Heyshope Dam on the Assegaai River, built to supply Sasol 111, takes enough 
water out of the Usutu River (Swaziland's largest) to irrigate 3000 hectares. In 
mid-1984 plans were announced for a dam on the Komati River. The dam would be in 
Swaziland but the lake would stretch into South Africa and both countries would draw 
from the lake. The Komati flows back into South Africa and then into Mozambique, 
but so much water is already taken out by South Africa that it is often dry at the 
border with Mozambique at Nkomati. This dam will further increase the integration 
of the Swazi and South African economies and leave Mozambique ever more vulnerable. 
(c) The Southern Africa Customs Union 
Despite 17 years of independence and several development plans, the annual 
payout from SACU's common customs pool remains vital to the Swazi economy. In 
1981-82 it constituted 46.01% of total government revenue. Over the next two years 
it soared to 61.05% and 64.88%, respectively, while the anticipated grant of E130 
million in 1984-85 will amount to 64.23%, the slight drop resulting from the 
introduction in 1984 of a government sales tax. '  
SACU operates on a unanimous consent basis and the dissent of one party 
can forestall agreements. Not surprisingly, South Africa has most often used this 
veto power, and even against its Swazi "ally". The fate of Swaziland Chemical 
Industries (SCI) illustrates well how the South African government can, and does, 
use SACU and other protectionist devices to guard its economic interests, 
irrespective of the consequences to its partners. SCI was formed in 1975 to produce 
fertiliser and explosives for the South African market which, in regard to 
fertilisers, was monopolised - with government support - by Triomf and Fedrnis, 
pillars of the Afrikaner capitalist establishment. They used their monopoly to 
produce high-cost fertiliser. SCI1s intention was to offer cheaper fertiliser by 
using cheap ammonium imports from Iran. From the outset, the South African 
government, the Fertiliser Board and Fertiliser Producers' Association collaborated 
t o  break SCI. F i r s t  Triomf and Fedmis c u t  t h e i r  wholesale p r i ces  t o  Swaziland t o  
below those i n  the  Republic, s o  t h a t  t h e i r  Swazi supplier  could undercut SCI. Then 
the  South African government, per SACU ru les ,  denied SCI potash import subsidies 
given t o  loca l  f irms,  and then SAR refused t o  carry SCI's f e r t i l i s e r .  In  1980 and 
1982 South Africa imposed fur ther  dut ies  aimed a t  hurt ing SCI and then cu t  a l l  
import dut ies ,  which ended SCI1s import advantage over the  South African 
manufacturers. I n  1984 SCI collapsed, throwing over 300 people out  of work and 
leaving debts of over R60 mill ion,  hal f  of which were owed t o  the  l o c a l  branches of 
Barclays and Standard Banks. 
In  1983 SCI had accounted f o r  13% of  Swaziland's exports and was second 
only t o  sugar a s  an earner of export revenue. Its collapse was a cruel  blow t o  an 
already slumping economy. Even though t h i s  was a case of the South African 
government s id ing  with "big" agains t  ffsmalllt  cap i t a l  (SCI was owned by a South 
African group), absolutely no regard was paid t o  the  needs and pleas  of a f r iendly  
partner. They were ignored with imper ia l i s t  disdain. 
3. P o l i t i c a l  Relations 
To understand these re la t ions ,  an explanation of the  Swazi p o l i t i c a l  system and how 
power is dis t r ibuted within it, a s  well a s  of the internecine s t ruggles  which have 
recently plagued the  country, is necessary. 
The system is a complex, d iarchic  one, with re la ted  s e t s  of i n s t i t u t i o n s  - 
one known a s  the "Swazi Nation" while the  other is the Swazi government, comprising 
Parliament and the  Cabinet. It was here t h a t  the  instruments of independence vested 
most const i tu t ional  authori ty but  the  King, a s  Head of S ta te ,  was given the  power t o  
nominate s u f f i c i e n t  members of Parliament a s  well a s  t o  s e l e c t  the Prime Minister, 
t o  make him more than a symbolic figurehead. In ac tua l i ty ,  Sobhuza dominated the 
p o l i t i c a l  arena from the  moment of independence but,  even so,  resented the  
const i tu t ional  const ra in ts  on h i s  exercise of unchecked power and, i n  1973, he 
scrapped the  Westminster arrangement. Power reverted t o  the  t r a d i t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  of the  "Swazi Nation" which had survived the  colonial  period i n t a c t ,  
even though t h e i r  authori ty had been l imited t o  t h a t  one-third of the  land reserved 
f o r  Swazi communal occupation and production. 
This meant t h a t  Sobhuza exercised, by decree, supreme executive, 
l eg i s l a t ive  and judic ia l  power, aided by a c i r c l e  of advisers. Mostly these were 
members of  the  Liqoqo, then a small and near anonymous group consis t ing mainly of 
princes and chiefs  but i n t o  which commoners could be co-opted. This arrangement 
continued u n t i l  1978, when Parliament was reopened but with its membership now 
emerging from an e lec to ra l  system s o  designed as  t o  ensure domination by l o y a l i s t s  
t o  t r ad i t iona l  custom. Its functions were changed a s  well.  Stripped of independent 
policy-making authori ty,  it was reduced t o  enacting i n t o  law the  decisions of 
Sobhuza and the  Liqoqo. Only weeks before he died, Sobhuza issued a proclamation 
giving formal const i tu t ional  recognition t o  the  Liqoqo a s  the Supreme Council of 
S ta te  and expanding its membership t o  16 sa la r i ed  o f f i c i a l s .  None the  l e s s ,  h i s  
death created a huge void and three  po ten t i a l  power centres  - the  Liqoqo, the  
Cabinet ( then headed by Prime Minister Prince Mabandla), and the  Regency of 
Sobjuzafs senior wife, Dzeliwe, a s s i s t ed  by the  Authorised Person, Prince Sozisa. 
Factional  s t r i f e  was inevi table  but not ,  o r  even mainly, f o r  supreme s t a t e  
power. Two other elements sharpened the  conf l i c t  s i tua t ion :  one, a legitimacy 
dispute within the  royal  family dating back t o  the controversial  se lec t ion i n  1899 
of Sobhuza a s  successor t o  King Bhunu which had s p l i t  the  family i n t o  two fact ions ,  
one loyal  t o  the Sobhuza l i n e  and the  other t o  a l ineage headed by Prince 
Mfanasibili; the other related to the fact that the Swazi Nation (read royal 
family) had developed a considerable material base through a development corporation 
called the Tibiyo Fund. This latter is particularly important. 
Set up in 1967, Tibiyo has used its original revenues from mineral rights 
to purchase freehold land from non-Swazis, establish its own agricultural estates 
and other businesses and purchase equity in almost every important foreign 
enterprise in Swaziland. In so doing, it has accumulated millions of emalangeni. 
Moreover, its operations are free of public scrutiny. No annual statement is 
published, Parliament has no say in its operations and government gets no revenue 
from it as it is exempt from taxation. Control is by a board appointed by the 
monarch and has always included several princes. In fact, it is a source of 
accumulation for the royal family. Its operating style is to set up a partnership 
with foreign capital, normally by acquiring a 40% minority stake, or, where it has.a 
majority holding, by signing a management contract with the foreign partner. In 
this way Tibiyo has spread vertically into all sectors of the economy as foreign 
capital's junior partner, and increasingly that partner is South African. So it can 
be seen that the material prosperity of the Swazi royalist rulers is heavily 
dependent upon the relationship with South African capital. 
For years the driving force in Tibiyo was its general manager, Sishayi 
Nxumalo. A close confidante of Sobhuza, he often acted as his roving ambassador 
and, as such, travelled extensively in Europe and Africa and developed close ties to 
major political and business figures. An able and ambitious politician, he, 
however, lacked an essential ingredient for advancement in the ascriptive Swazi 
political hierarchy - membership of the royal family. In the view of many 
observers, therefore, his best political prospects lay in advancing from his Tibiyo 
base into the post-Sobhuza political vacuum. As a shrewd operator and with a 
pre-independence opposition background, Nxumalo was thus suspect in the eyes of 
traditional royalists like Prince Mfanasibili, who envisaged Tibiyo maintaining its 
function of bolstering the existing order. 
The factional struggles of recent years, therefore, have been confined to 
the palace and have been for its domination and for control over Tibiyo's resources. 
State power followed from these as a matter of course. They have developed in three 
main phases. (11) The first, in early 1983, was little more than a preliminary 
skirmish and involved an abortive attempt by Prime Minister Prince Mabandla to shift 
the locus of policy-making power into the Cabinet and away from the Liqoqo. His 
failure led him into exile in South Africa and succession by a staunch 
traditionalist unlikely to attempt to alter the status quo of cabinet subordination. 
The next was more decisive and produced the deposition of Queen Regent Dzeliwe and 
her replacement by Ntombi LaTfwala, mother of the designated heir, Prince 
Makhosetive. A clash with the Liqoqo over the locus of ultimate authority was the 
ostensible reason but the real cause was the old legitimacy/succession quarrel, for 
her removal enabled the Mfanasibili line to seize the Regency and, with it, 
domination of the royal family. By this time a small clique around Mfanasibili was 
in control of the Liqoqo, from which most of the Sobhuza-Dzeliwe followers had been 
purged. 
The stage was now set for a show-down between Mfanasibili and Nxumalo, and 
it began when, after elections for Parliament in November 1983, Nxumalo found 
himself removed from Tibiyo and moved sideways into the cabinet as Finance Minister 
- a prestigious but less powerful position. The Liqoqo's strategy seems to have 
been to remove him from his power base while not alienating the business community, 
whose confidence he enjoyed. Nxumalo, however, hit back with a series of 
allegations about corruption in high state circles, implicating Mfanasibili and some 
of his close allies. One related to a scheme which had defrauded SACU of R13 
million in customs duties and into which the South African government demanded a 
joint enquiry and whose accompanying threats left the Swazi government no choice but 
to agree. At this point Nxumalo, accompanied, amongst others, by the army and 
police chiefs, convened a press conference to announce that the Queen Regent had 
dismissed Mfanasibili and one key supporter from the Liqoqo. Within days the tables 
had turned and all those involved in the press conference were out of jobs and soon 
under detention and facing treason charges. A year later they were still 
incarcerated and with the chwges still pending. 
By mid-1984, therefore, the Mfanasibili faction had control of the palace, 
of the Liqoqo and of Tibiyo. Despite this apparent omnipotence, its political grip 
was distinctly shaky, largely because its ousting of Dzeliwe was regarded by a 
section of the royal family, and most of the Swazi people, as a violation of sacred 
custom. To them, Ntombi and those who had put her in the Regency were illegitimate 
usurpers. 
In the course of all these shenanigans, Swaziland's political position had 
shifted significantly into alignment with Pretoria. This was manifest in two major 
developments in 1984 - the crack-down on the ANC and the decision to exchange trade 
missions. The assault on the ANC was explained at the time as being in 
implementation of Swaziland's Security Agreement with South Africa. This pact dated 
from Sobhuzafs time but few believe he ever envisaged, or would have permitted, the 
grotesque spectacle Swaziland presented in 1984. He had had a long association with 
the ANC, his relatives had been involved in its establishment, and he had a cordial 
relationship with President Tambo. After Mozambique's independence, he permitted 
the ANC a low-key but official presence in the country and a blind eye was often 
turned to the actions of its guerrillas. His motive in entering into the security 
pact with South Africa actually had little to do with the ANC. Instead, it was his 
eagerness to regain "lost land" which South Africa exploited to shift him away from 
this protectionist position towards the ANC. The areas involved had long been 
claimed by Swaziland and the reuniting of the Swazi peoples was a life-long ambition 
of Sobhuza's. Hence his decision to initial a secret pact in early 1982. 
Initial Swazi implementation was limited to the expulsion of the veteran 
ANC representative in the country - a serious but not crippling blow. South African 
agents then moved in and murdered his deputy. Sobhuzals death six months after the 
pact's signing removed a major constraint to those wanting a more vigorous crack- 
down. In 1983 the pressure on the ANC intensified with the killing of two alleged 
activists and the deportation of some 25 others. (12) But it was the Nkomati Accord 
which led to a "no holds barred" position. Swaziland's leaders seem to have seen it 
as legitimating their own collaboration with apartheid and they went public with 
their accord. 
L 
After Nkomati, over 200 alleged ANC members were deported, usually after 
periods of detention in which they were routinely assaulted. A few were killed 
resisting capture, while at least five appear to have fallen into the hands of the 
South Africans. As significant was the accompanying ideological assault which made 
it clear who it was that the Swazi rulers saw as their real enemies. The ANC was 
branded as "a scourge of foreign criminals" and President Tambo "a liar"; the media 
exhorted the public "to watch their neighbors" and to "turn in suspicious 
characters" such as unattached young men with foreign accents; a Commission of 
Enquiry into student disturbances at the University clearly articulated the State's 
view that support for the ANC and its goals constituted a "security threat" and was 
tantamount to a crime. It found Itan unhealthy preoccupation with the philosophies, 
aims and objectives of the ANC", and this was used as grounds for the Liqoqo 
ordering the expulsion of the entire student leadership on campus (21 students) as 
well as two senior staff members. 
At the height of their anti-ANC vendetta the Swazi and South African 
governments agreed to an exchange of trade missions. The South African mission 
opened in November 1984 with six accredited diplomats. Sceptics wondered why, after 
years of near friction-free trade relations, a new framework beyond SACU should now 
be required. The Commissioner himself provided the answer. "I see the work of the 
mission as going a bit further than promoting trade ... trade between South,Africa 
and Swaziland will look after itself but we can look after other developments." (14) 
Given the known presence in the mission of at least one senior officer of the 
National Intelligence Service, as well as Commissioner Sterban's description of 
relations between the Swazi and South African police as "good", and his statement 
that "the policies of both countries are reflected in the relations between the two 
police forces ... I think this is only to be expected between police forces of any 
neighbouring countries that have a similar policyw (151, it seems reasonable to 
assume that intelligence will be one of those "other developments1'. 
4. Conclusion 
By 1985, Swaziland's rulers appeared tied body and soul to the South African 
government, having moved beyond collaboration in the ANC onslaught to advocating 
some of apartheid's most important policy positions. In May, the Swazi Finance 
Minister criticised the disinvestment campaign and that position was carried into 
SADCC, some of whose members saw positive investment possibilities for themselves in 
capital's withdrawal from the Republic. Simultaneously, the Swazi Foreign Minister 
came out against economic sanctions and appealed to the world to "give South Africa 
a chance to sort out its problems. We have been really impressed by what South 
Africa has been doing for the last years trying to improve conditions in this part 
of the world, ... (South Africa is) on the right track as far as we are 
concerned". (16) Quite how he saw five years of South African destabilisation as 
improving the lot of the region was not explained, while his appeal for more time in 
a context of South Africa's murderous repression of the black townships seemed to 
express the Swazi state's indifference to the suffering and struggles of South 
Africa's blacks. 
At various points I have suggested why it is that Swaziland has emerged as 
apartheid's ally but a more coherent and detailed explanation is now required. 
First, however, two preliminary points are relevant: 
Earlier, in the introduction, I rejected economic coercion as the primary 
motive for Swaziland's co-operation with Pretoria. The same applies to a related 
motive - the prospect of material gain. While it may have been an early inducement 
(the possibility of additional land), the reality is that, in the years since 1982 
and as Swaziland moved more and more into Pretoria's orbit, no material rewards were 
forthcoming. Indeed, quite the reverse. In fact, the Swazi leaders have good 
grounds for feeling spuriously treated, even betrayed. The "land dealM is a good 
example. It was the "carrot" which triggered the Swazi confrontation with the ANC. 
Yet, at the height of their vendetta, Pik Botha backed out of the "dealv telling the 
Swazi to negotiate the issue with the relevant Bantustan leaders, knowing full well 
that any agreement between those parties was impossible. Moreover, Pretoria then 
abandoned its attempt to abolish the KaNgwane legislature and instead up-graded its 
constitutional status, gave it an economic aid package, and designated the Kabokweni 
area a udeconcentration'' growth point with some of the most attractive investment 
incentives in the Bantustans as a whole - well beyond anything Swaziland could 
offer. Located close to the Swazi border, Kabokweni could only increase Swaziland's 
difficulties of attracting new investors and accelerate the already steady flight to 
the Bantustans of Swazi-based firms. (17) Contemporaneous with all this, the South 
African government was engaging in actions which resulted in the bankruptcy of 
Swaziland's most lucrative industrial enterprise (SCI). With this record, it seems 
that all Swaziland's "good behaviour" earned it was a South African diplomatic 
mission and international derision. 
The second point is that there is actually nothing new in this foreign 
policy of Swaziland's. Throughout its existence the Swazi royal family has revealed 
a tendency to co-operate with the region's powerful imperialist forces - Boer, 
British, Portuguese and South African. On four separate occasions between 1864 and 
1876 Swazi soldiers aided the Boers in military campaigns against various indigenous 
groups and, in 1879, joined the British in the war which destroyed Pedi 
independence. (18) In the 1960s prominent South African refugees, most notably 
D e ~ i s  Brutus (19), found themselves back in South African custody, while in the 
1970s Frelimo refugees were occasionally handed back to the Portuguese. 
The close ties to Pretoria have to be interpreted with these background 
factors in mind. They damage Swaziland's image in SADCC, the OAU, and the wider 
international community; they expose government leaders to hostility and criticism 
on the international stage; they alienate donors and deter potential donors, and 
they reap no economic fruits from South Africa. I am convinced, too, that the 
majority of the Swazi people do not approve, and identify with the struggle for 
black majority rule in South Africa. But all that is irrelevant to the princes who 
constitute the real state elite in Swaziland. They share with apartheid's rulers 
the view that Africa's indigenous societies should be ruled by their traditional 
aristocrats. While this may be a self-serving view in Pretoria, in Swazi royalist 
circles it is an unquestioned article of faith. However, the reality which 
increasingly confronts these aristocrats is that time is running out on this notion. 
The prevailing revolutionary forces coursing through Southern Africa have produced 
regimes (Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Angola) which represent class forces oppressed and 
exploited in Swaziland. Swazi royalty deeply fears these forces and developments, 
and particularly that they will one day produce an ANC-ruled South Africa. The 
regime in Swaziland is the direct antithesis of that to which the ANC aspires and 
Swazi royalty's concern is that an ANC government in South Africa would generate 
forces fundamentally threatening to their ability to cling to power. Thus, with the 
struggle against apartheid escalating and growing more militant, Swazi royalty has 
been forced to acknowledge that its best interests lie not in change but in the 
survival of the apartheid regime, a position which is reinforced by their economic 
interests as a comprador class. Tibiyo, with its links to South African capital, 
provides Swazi royalty with what is little more than a "slush fundt1 with which to 
enrich itself and propagate its ideological interests. (20) Thus it was no surprise 
that the Swazi Prime Minister should choose the occasion of his opening speech to 
the SADCC Council of Ministers' meeting to give an unabashed defence of the 
relationship with South Africa, giving it even a theological justification: 
The Swazi people have learned from the greatest 
authorities that if one is to become prosperous he 
should love his neighbour as he loves himself. 
Regardless of the differences of political 
ideologies as pursued by your neighbour, you are 
expected to live peacefully with your neighbour. 
The Kingdom of Swaziland has had criticisms 
showered upon her in respect of political . 
philosophy ... Today I want to make it clear that 
there is nothing wrong with our policy. (21) 
From the point of view of a senior prince of an endangered aristocracy, he 
is correct. Not only is it not wrong, it makes sense. The Swazi rulers know well 
the fate that befell the regime of Haile Selassie. They know that time and history 
are not on their side. With the revolutionary struggle maturing in southern Africa, 
there is only one place they can look for succour - in the bosom of apartheid. 
------ooo------ 
*This paper was presented on 1st November 1985. 
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